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India’s post-Independence history has been punctuated with incidents of mass violence but very few of the
perpetrators have been brought to justice. Surabhi Chopra argues that these continuing failures of
justice are a result of incomplete and inaccurate logging of the cases, witness intimidation and a
lack of government commitment to seeing prosecutions through.
A relief camp in Nepania village, Panchmahal district, Gujarat in 2002. The camp did not
receive relief supplies from the Gujarat government until April 15, six weeks after the village
was attacked. Photo by Dionne Bunsha, originally published in Frontline magazine, April
27-May 12 2002.
Last year, when Narendra Modi was running for national office, he was asked surprisingly few questions about the
deaths of over a thousand Muslims in Gujarat twelve years earlier. Clearly, Mr Modi had managed to successfully
distance himself from the mass violence that unfolded in his home state in 2002, during his tenure as Chief Minister.
However, human rights groups have documented that this violence was supported, organised and led by members
of the Bharatiya Janata Party, as well as closely affiliated Hindu nationalist organisations including the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh, Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad, with the acquiescence, if not active support, of the
Gujarat government. Years later, only a tiny proportion of those involved have been brought to justice. Similar
impunity has been enjoyed by members of the Indian National Congress who participated in mass violence against
Sikhs after prime minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated on 30 October 1984. Even today, some criminal
proceedings related to violence in 2002 and 1984 splutter on, with victims recounting what they suffered and
witnesses reporting what they saw, even though the results of similar proceedings suggest that perpetrators are
unlikely to be found guilty.
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A mob attacks a Sikh man. Delhi, October 1984. Photo by Ashok Vahie, originally published
in Caravan magazine (Bal, ‘Sins of Commission’), 1 October 2014.
How does this happen? To fathom these continuing failures of justice, a recent book delved into the official records
generated after four of the worst episodes of mass violence in independent India. On Their Watch: Mass violence
and State apathy in India (Chopra & Jha eds., Three Essays Collective 2014) examines the state’s response after
mass sectarian violence in Nellie, Assam in 1983, Delhi in 1984, Bhagalpur, Bihar in 1989 and Gujarat in 2002. The
authors, including myself, filed over 800 applications under India’s right to information law to secure official records
on, inter alia, criminal justice following these episodes of targeted, systematic violence that killed and injured
hundreds of people and displaced thousands from their homes.
Why criminal prosecution fails
We tried to track official decisions from the point when a person first approached the police, through investigation,
trial, and ultimately, appeals against trial verdicts. First information reports (FIRs), which record initial complaints
about crimes, were available for all four episodes of mass violence, and so were charge-sheets, which record the
offences for which the state is putting suspects on trial. Records after trials begin – applications by the prosecution
to charge the accused person with additional offences, for example, or applications for bail by the defence or
appeals against the verdict at trial – were very difficult to access, except in Gujarat.
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Mallika Begum was the only survivor of the massacre in Chanderi village, near Bhagalpur.
The Muslims of Chanderi were persuaded to come out of hiding by the police. They were
then surrounded and hacked to death by an armed mob. Mallika Begum was 14 when she
testified about what happened in Chanderi. Photo by Javed Iqbal , originally published on Al
Jazeera, 31 December 2014.
Even without complete trial records, the pre-trial records we secured were revealing. Across all four episodes of
mass violence, we found that the police had registered flawed FIRs. The names of attackers, along with other
identifying details, were erased. Details of violence – people killed, limbs hacked, houses burnt, belongings looted –
might be recorded, but perpetrators were identified simply as ‘persons’ or ‘mob’. FIRs recorded after the Nellie
massacre did not even specify what happened to individual complainants. Instead, these documents had identical
pro-forma text, individuated only in listing possessions lost by the complainant. Clearly, these FIRs were never
meant to be anything other than paperwork for whatever financial aid the government might disburse. Some FIRs –
particularly after violence in Delhi and Gujarat – yoked together multiple disparate incidents. For example, attacks in
different villages by different people would be included in the same ‘omnibus’ report, confusing any investigation that
might follow.
Civil society research indicates that victims often named their attackers when complaining to the police. Many
participants in mob attacks belonged to political parties, and some were prominent figures, locally if not regionally or
nationally. Furthermore, many bystanders witnessed and many journalists recorded the very public violence of 1983,
1984, 1989 and 2002. Widespread erasure of perpetrators names from FIRs was, therefore, a systematic choice
that the police made when they investigated these episodes of violence. Absent crucial details, FIRs provided a poor
foundation for investigating the crimes they recorded, and an easy route to closing cases without gathering enough
evidence to put anyone on trial.
It is not surprising, then, that a very high proportion of cases filed after mass violence are summarily closed, i.e. the
state opts not to charge anyone with a crime and sets the case aside. We found that cases relating to mass violence
in Delhi, Bhagalpur and Gujarat were summarily closed at rates ten times higher than the national rate for summary
closure of offences in the year closest to each particular episode. Cases relating to the Nellie massacre were
summarily closed at a rate eight times higher than the relevant national rate. Seventy percent of cases filed after
mass violence in Bhagalpur were closed, as were fifty six percent of cases filed in Nellie, fifty percent in Gujarat and
thirty seven percent in Delhi.
Thus, less than half the complaints filed after these episodes of mass violence led to criminal charges. And the
cases that escaped summary closure were prosecuted very poorly by the state. Records from Gujarat showed that
the prosecution applied for defendants to be custodialised rather than released on bail in only twenty percent of
cases. By the same token, the state opposed fewer than six percent of bail applications  by the defence.
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Police interrogating Sabira Kharadi, whose husband
Jabir was killed in Pandharvada, Gujarat in 2002. twenty
people were killed in the Pandhavardha massacre, and
declared missing by the police. In 2006, survivors of the
massacre were investigated by the police for digging up
a mass grave to retrieve the remains of their murdered
relatives. Photo by Dionne Bunsha, originally published
in Frontline, Jan. 14 – 27, 2006
This prosecutorial passivity matters a great deal. Defendants have a
legal right to bail and should not lose their liberty unless releasing them
jeopardises the criminal proceedings at hand. In mass violence trials,
such jeopardy is manifest, but prosecutors and judges have chosen to
ignore it. Defendants on bail are more likely to delay trials, applying for
repeated adjournments, absenting themselves from court, and in a few
cases, leaving the country. Protracted trials strain the resources and
resolve of witnesses. When a trial takes years, the days of time and
wages lost have proved prohibitive for many witnesses, as have
threats and coercion by politically connected defendants. With scant
witness-protection by the state, many trials collapse because
witnesses ‘turn hostile’ to the prosecution case.
But witness intimidation was not the only stumbling block in mass
violence trials. Rates of acquittal were so high as to suggest that the
prosecution had been deliberately lackadaisical, and judges passive to
the point of subverting fair, credible trials. The Assam government went
the furthest in this regard. It withdrew all criminal cases relating to the
Nellie massacre (and other violence during fraught elections in Assam
in 1983) – even cases related to murder and grievous bodily harm –
after a peace deal was signed in 1985 between the national
government and leaders of the anti-foreigner movement in Assam.
Samples of cases relating to mass violence in Delhi and Gujarat
indicate an acquittal rate of over ninety percent – not quite as bad as
the Assam government’s blanket amnesty, but far too close to it.
We received very little information on whether state governments appealed these acquittals. Our RTI applications
about criminal appeals bounced from one public authority to another, suggesting that decision-making about appeals
is chaotic and ad hoc. It is highly unlikely that governments are committed to appealing ‘not guilty’ verdicts, given the
trail of diluted FIRs, summary closures, and shoddy, biased prosecution that leads to such a high proportion of
defendants being acquitted.
The research project that led to On Their Watch: Mass violence and State apathy in India was
housed within the Centre for Equity Studies, guided by social activist Harsh Mander and
supported by the International Development Research Centre. The research team included
human rights lawyers Prita Jha, Anubha Rastogi and Suroor Mander, and RTI-specialist Rekha
Koli.
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